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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
BUDGET LOAN AND
FINANCE PLAN,
Defendant and Appellant,
Case No. 9224

vs.

BUDGET SYSTEM, INC.,
Plaintiff and R.espondent.
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court,
In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, District Judge
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a Decree and Judgment
from 'the Third Judicial District Court, with the
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson presiding, made and
entered on the 29th day of January, 1960 (R. 189,
190), in which the Honorable Court enjoined, restrained and prohibited the defendant and appel]
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lant, Budget Loan and Finance Plan, from doing
business under its present name Budget Loan and
Finance Plan or any other name which incorporates the' word "Budget" within the Salt Lake City
area. (The citation "R." followed by a number
refers to pages of the Record on Appeal).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent's predecessors in interest, Mr.
and Mrs. Hugh Barker, incorporated under the name
of Budget Sys'tem, Inc. a small loan and finance
business in the City and County of Salt Lake, in
the year 1928 (R. 33, 184), on West Fourth South
Street, and then in the year 192'9 they moved to
Motor Avenue. In 1930 the Bank Commissioner
of: the State of Utah issued it a small loan license.
In the calendar year 1935, Budget System disincorporated ( R. 33, 184). Immediately thereafter
Mr. and Mrs. Hugh Barker engaged in the small
loan and finance business under the assumed name
of Budget System, the Bank Commissioner issuing
a small 'loan license to them. An affidavit as required by statute of doing business under an assumed name was filed in the office of the County
Cle~k of Salt Lake County (R. 34, 185).
The Barkers continued such small loan and
finance business under the name of Budget System
until the calendar year 1957, wl1en the partnership
2
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of Barkers transferred its small loans only to a
corporation incorporated in 1957 as Budget System,
Inc., the responden't herein ( R. 34). From 1940
to 1945 they did business at 763 South State Street.
From 1945 until the present time 'they did business
at 854 South Sta te S'treet ( R. 33) .
1

At the same time the Barkers filed under the
na1ne of Budget System, in 1935 they also filed
an affidavi't of doing business under an assumed
name, as required by statute, under the name of
Bu·dget Finance ( R. 34, 185). They commenced
to do business under the name Budget Finance ( R.
51). The partnership of the Barkers did bu'siness
under the name Budget Finance from the period
of 19'35 to 1957 (R. 52). In 195'7 the assets of the
Budget Finance Company (a separa'te and distinct
company from Budget System, Inc.) were so'ld to
Barker & Company, and Mr. Barker and his wife
as a partnership ceased to do business under 'the
name of Budget Finance in the fall of 1957 (R. 55).
In the calen·dar year of 195'7, Barkers sold all
of their stock in Budget Systern, Inc. ( R. 185) .
Budget Finance Plan of California in 1948,
(parent company of this appellant) caused 'to be
filed in the office of the Secretary of the State of
Utah Articles of Incorporation of the Budget Loan
and Finance Plan (R. 140, 141) .(Exhibit D-18).
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Budget Loan and Finan·ce Plan was the Utah
parent of the two operating subsidiaries in Utah
( R. 141) , 'the two subsidiaries being Friendly Service & Finance Company, which changed its name
to Credit Finance Plan and Credit Industrial Loan
Plan. These two corporations were engaged in the
business of making srna'll and industrial loans, under
the laws of Utah; Budget Loan and Finance Plan,
a Utah corporation, owning all of the stock of these
two corporations (R. 142).
Financing in Utah was through the Budget
Loan and Finance 'Plan ( R. 143) .
The year 1958 was a year of substantial change
for the parent corporation Budget Finance Plan
(of California) (R. 144), which had over a sixty
percent increase in the number of its offices. That
is, it a;cquired 3'7 additional operating units (R.
144). They \Vere located in California, Ohio, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and
Utah (R. 144).
In 1958 they changed tl1e name of 20 units
which the parent corporation operated 'to "Budget
Finance Plan" from other names ( R. 145). The
reason for such action was that because of the
geographical expansion it became important to have
a single name for purposes of advertising and publicity (R. 145, 146). Bank lines and financing were
·-I
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n1ore successful in having the name ''Budget Finance
Plan.''
This ·appellant is a wholly owned subsidiary of Budget Finance Plan, a California corporatioi1, which corporation is engaged in the finance
business through some 93 branch offices or subsidiary corporations in 16 states under that name
or substantially similar names and has been in
business for more than twenty years ( R. 18'5).
In 1958, in line vvith fts policy, application
was made to the Bank Comn1issioner of the State
of Utah for a change of name from "Credit Finance"
to "Budget Loan and Finance Plan", ('the name
of its parent Utah company incorporated in 1948),
its two offices being at 802 South State Street and
1063 East 21st South, Salt Lake City, Utah (R.
147). Mr. Seth· Young, the Sta:te Bank Commissioner, granted the application and issued a license
(Exhibit D-20); this license permi'tted this appellant the righl to operate as a small loan company
at 802 South State Street and 1063 East 21st South,
under the name of Budget Loan and Finance P'lan.
The aforementioned operations come under the
direct supervision of the State Bank Commissioner
by virtue of Section 7-10, Utah Code Annotated
195'3, as amended ( R. 14 7) .
The place of business of respondent was not
occupied solely by respondent, but by American Co-op
5
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Finance Co. (who owns Budget System) (R. 116).
This company does a finance business. However,
it had made an application for an industrial loan
license ( no'twiths'tanding the fact that there is already a finance ·company operating under the supervision of the State Banking Department under the
name of American Finance Company). The only
difference in the names was the word "Co-op" (R.
117). This application was pending at the time
of trial. The American Buyers Insurance used twothirds of the building and Budget System and American Co-op Finance Co. together used one-third
(R. 68, 69).
After the issuance of permission by the Bank
Commissioner of the State of Utah to this appellant
to do business under the name of Budget Loan and
Finance Plan, mail and telepl1one calls directed to
this appellant were received by the respondent (R.
67, 82 and 83). However, telephone calls directed
to this appellant and received by the responden't
diminished after the appellant's name, Budget Loan
and Finance Plan appeared in the telephone directory of August 1959 (R. 82, 8'3).
There is no evidence that tl1e use of the word
"Budget" in appellant's name caused any confusion
or deception among the present or potential customers of respondent.
From a judgn1ent and decree forever enjoining_,
6
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restraining and prol1ibiting this appellant from
doing business under its present name of Budget
Loan and Finance Plan or any other name which
incorporates the name "Budget" within the Salt
Lake City area, this appellant appeals to this Honorable Court.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT
T'I-IE vVORD "BUDGET" IN THE NAME OF A'PPELLANT SINCE NOVEMBER 1958 HAS CAUSED AND
WILL CONTINUE TO CAUSE CONFUSION AND DECEPTION TO THE PUBLIC INTI-IE SALT LAKE CITY
AREA AMONG PRESENT AND POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS THEREIN; THAT THE SIMILARITY OF SAID
NAME IS A DECEPTIVE USE BY THE DEFENDANT,
AN UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE, AND HAS AND WILL
RESULT IN PR·OBABL'E DAMAGE T'O RESPONDENT'S
BUSI~~ESS.

POINT II.
THE COURT, ERRED IN FINDING THAT TH·E
USE OF THE NATh1E "BUDGET LOAN AN'D FINANCE
PLAN" HAS WORKED 'I'O THE INJURY. OF THE
RESPONDENT IN AN UNDETERMINABLE AM'OUNT
AND IF CONTINUED WILL RESULT IN FURTHER
AND INCREASED PREJUDICE TO RESPONDE.NT'S
BUSINESS.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT HAS ACQUIRED THE EXCLUSIVE
RIGHT TO USE OF THE W·ORD "BUDGET" IN CONDUCTING ITS CREDIT AND LOAN BUSINESS IN
THE SALT LAKE CITY AREA.
7
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POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS DECREE
IN FAVOR OF THE RESP·ONDENT HEREIN, BUDGET
SYSTElVI, INC., AND AS AGAINST THIS APPELLANT,
BUDGET LOAN AND FINANCE PLAN.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT
THE WORD "BUDGET" IN THE NAME ·OF APPELLANT SINCE NOVEMBER 1958 l-IAS CAUSED AND
WILL CONTINUE TO CAUSE CONFUSION AND DECEPTION TO THE PUBLIC IN THE SALT LAKE CITY
AREA AMONG PRESENT AND POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS THEREIN; THAT THE SIMILARITY OF SAID
NAME IS A DECEPTIVE USE BY THE DEFENDANT,
AN UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE, AND HAS AND WILL
RESULT IN PROBABLE DAMAGE TO RESP01'~DENT'S
BUSINESS.
POINT II.
THE CO.URT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
USE OF THE NAME "BUDGET LOAN AND FINANCE
PLAN" HAS WORI{ED TO THE IN JURY OF THE
RESPiONDENT IN A,N UND·ETERMINABLE AMOUNT
AND IF CONTINUED WILL RESULT IN FURTHER
AND INCREASED PREJUDICE TO RESPONDENT'S
B'USINESS.

In equity cases the appeal ( Const. Utah, art.
8, §9) may be on questions of both law and fact.
Such is the appeal in this case. On such review the
duty of this court requires an examination of all
questions of 'law and all facts revealed by the record,
an·d, after making such examination and due allowance for the beltter opportunity afforded the trial
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court to observe the demeanor of witnesses, and
more advantageous position of determining their
credibility and the weight to be given to the testi~
1nony submitted, this court, analogous to a . trial
de novo on the record, will determine from a fair
preponderance or greater weight of the evidence
whether or not the findings of the trial court are
supported therebye (Corey v. Roberts, 25 P. 2d 940·;
Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 61 Utah 298, 212 P. 526).
The action of the respondenl is one for alleged
unfair competition in that the respondent contends
that this appellant has infringed upon respondent's
right in its name "Budget System". The basis for
such an action to enjoin unfair con1petition is essentially one of fraud and deceit. (Ni1ns Unfair Competition and Trade Marks, Fourth Edition, Sec'tion
6, Pages 40 and 41, citing Reynolds & Reynolds vs.
Norick (CA lOth 1940) 114 F. 2d 278~
There is no evidence whatsoever in the record
of any fraud or deceit on the part of this appellant.
There is no evidence that the operation of this appellant under the name Budget Loan and Finance
Plan has caused or will continue to cause confusion
or deception in the Salt Lake Area among present
or potential customers therein.
In the review of the evidence it will be found
that a11y confusion that occurred was nothing more
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nor less than an inconvenience to the respondent
from the customers and people in making inquiry
for the respondent; that there is not one scintilla of
evidence to the effect that any customer of t4is
respondent was confused or deceived, or any person
deceived by virtue of 'the appellant's operation. The
on ly evidence as to inconvenience or confusion is
found in the record ( R. H7, 82, 83), which consisted of telephone calls and misdirected mail in
making inquiry for this appellant, and mail directed
to this appellant and delivered to the respondent.
Misdirected telephone calls dropped off after the
new telephone directory was issu~ed ( R. 83) , the
absence of Budget Loan and Finance Plan from the
telephone directory causing in most part the inconvenience to respondent.
1

We submi't to some extent that confusion exists
with all finance companies.
We believe that it is highly significant, however, that this confusion consisted entirely of appellant's ·Customers who by mistake called or wrote
to respondent, rather than respondent's customers
conta·cting appellant.
Mr. Barker's testimony, the predecessor of the
respondent herein, did not consider the names "Budget System" and "Budget Finance" to be so similar
'that they were included one with the other. The
10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

uncontradicted evidence is that Mr. Barker thought
to the contrary. He operated under the two names
"Budget System" and "Budget Finance". He even
went so far as to have the same filed of record in
the office of the County Clerk of Salt Lake County
as separate, distinct tradenames ( R. 34, 185), that
is, Budget System and Budget Finance, and operated under these names (R. 52). Mr. Barker, under
advice of counsel, filed these affidavits, that i's,
two names ( R. 48) Budget System and Budget Finance.
It appears to be fundamental in such actions
that some element of "passing off" or "palming off"
appel lant's business as the business of the respondent be involved.
1

The essence of a cause of action for unfair competition is the palming off of the
defendant's goods as those of the plaintiff,
thus injuring the reputation or business of
the plaintiff by causing the public to believe
that the defendan't's goods are those of the
plaintiff. Unless such a palming off is alleged
and proved by the plaintiff, there can be no
recovery for unfair competition. KinnearW.eed Corporation vs. Humble Oil and Refining Comp~any (USDC, Tex. 1956) 150 F.
Supp. 14·3 at page 160.
"Whatever the basis of 'the action, it is regarded
as an embodiment in the law of fair play". (Nims,
Section 6) .
11
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Having this general princip1e in mind, we refer
briefly to the general concepts of law involved in
such actions.

THE DOCTRINE OF SECONDARY MEANING:
The word which is common to both respondent's
and appellant's names is the word ''budget''. This
word is one of common usage and is not so fanciful
as to qualify as a trade mark under the technical
meaning af trade marks in the law. Indeed, the
word "budget" is a word of common usage in every
day language. The Court may take judicial notice
of the fact that the word "budget" has a well recognize'd general meaning. (Graves v. Purcell, Missouri, 85 S.W. 2d 543, 548, cited in 5 Words and
Phrases 862). The same may be said for p'laintiff's
entire name : "Budget System", which suggests a
sys'tem by which income and expenditure for a definite period are to be balanced. (Roov,e v. Stanley
County, South Dakota, 219 N.W. 122, 123, cited in
5 Words and Phrases 86.2) .
Such a word may be 'said to be in the common
domain or publici juris and is not subject to exclusive appropriation. It has been said:
.
The doc'trine is so well settled by·a multi'tude of cases that it is not necessary to cite
specific cases, that words in common use are
regarded ,as common property, and may be
12
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used by others in combination with other descriptive words, provided they are not so used
in combination with other descriptive words,
symbols, or designs as to render it probable
that 'they would mislead persons possessing
ordinary powers of perception. Fidelity Apprais~al Co. vs. Federal Appraisal Co., (Cal.
1933) 217 Cal. 307, 18 P. 2d 950 (emphasis
added).
Such a word is not entitled to protection unless
it has acquired what is known as "secondary meaning".
In order to restrain a competitor from using a
certain term in connection with his business, the
plaintiff must show that he has appropriated the
term to his exclusive use as an original technical
trade mark (\vhich isn't 'the case in this action),
or that the term possesses "a secondary meaning in
the public mind" which designates the plaintiff's
business and furnishes the basis for the charge of
unfair competition. In the absence of proof of secondary meaning, no protection is obtainable for
words in coramon usage or descriptive words used
as the na1ne or part thereof, of a firm or corporation. (150 ALR, page 1101). The prerequisites for
recovery for unfair competition include the establishment of a prior secondary meaning and of a
reasonable likelihood of confusion resulting from
defendant's appropriation of plaintiff's name and
good wilL (Federal Glass Comp~any v. Loshin (CA
2nd 1955) 224 F. 2d 100.)
19
~.)
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"Secondary meaning" deals with the significance, in law, of extensions of the meaning of word'S
and symbols to new uses. (Nims, Section 36, page
152). '~econdary meaning is association, nothing
more.
exis'ts only in the minds of those who identify some article of commerce or some business house
by some name or sign and associate the tv1o i11 thcb_:.
minds"~ ( Nims, page 154). \Vith regard to this
doct~in€ of secondary meaning, Judge Learned Hand
has said:
The single question, as I view it, in all
these cases, is merely one of fact; What do the
buyers understand by the word for whose use
the parties are contending? If they understand by it only the kind of goods sold, then,
I 'take i't, it makes no difference \Vhatever
\vhat efforts the plaintiff had made to get
them to understand more * * *. After all
presumptions and other procedural advantages have been weighed, the owner mus't
show that his mark means him, else he canno't prevent others from using it. Bayer Company vs. United Drug Company (USDC, NY
1921) 272 F. 505, 509, 513.

It

Mr. Nims, in his work on this subject, has said:
The questions involved in these cases
are: first, whether the name or device used
by the plaintiff is used by him a11d understood by the public to be used by him in a trade
\sense, as identifying him or his goods· second
when the pub'lic does give to the name' as used
by the plaintiff, a 'trade ~eaning, 'whether
the defendant has so used rt as to prevail on
1·1
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purcl1asers to buy defendant's goods, believing that they were getting the goods made by
the plaintiff. Of course, if the defendant used
direc't misrepresentation, the plaintiff's remedy is plain. But when the proof shows that
the defend,ant is ~[sing a term which is in gener,al use ~as ,a part of the langt~age and VJholly
or partially describes the goods in question,
it must be (l condition precedent to plaintiff's
sucoess that the term involved has come to
possess ,a secondary ,and further meraning, viz.
th,at the goods to which it refers, rare goods
sold by the pl,aintiff. Unless this be proved the
defendants are not in the wrong for they are
rnerely using a name to which they have as
much right as has the p'laintiff, and there is
no room for a charge of fraud or unfairness.
(Nims, page 157, emphasis ad'ded).
Another text writer has said:

* * * If plaintiff proves that the name or
word has been so exclusively identified with
his goods or business as 'to have acquired a
secondary meaning, so as to indicate his goods
or btlsiness, and his alone, he is entitled to
relief against another's deceptive use of such
terms, but if J~e fails in such proof, he is not
entitled to relief * * * ( 63 C.J., page 394,
quoted with approval in Academy of Motion
P~icture Arts an,d Sciences vs. Benson (Cal.
Sup Ct. 1940) 104 P. 2d 650, emphasis
added).
As sta'ted by another text writer:
To constitute unfair competition in respect to a trade name, two elements must be
present. The name raust have acquired a secondary meaning or significance which iden'tiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fies the plaintiff, and the defen.dant ~ust haye
unfairly used the name or a 'simulation of It,
to 'the prejudice of the plaintiff's interests. * * *
Where a plaintiff has failed to estab~ish
a secondary meaning in a word incapable of
being appropriated as a technica~ trade mar~,
* * * such fact is fatal to an action of unfair
competition predicated solely upon the use by
the defendant of such word * * *. (Anno 150
ALR, page 1076).
Some examples of common or generic v1ords
which have acquired a secondary meaning are:
Ivory, when used in connection with soap; Standard,
used in connection with petroleum products, etc.
(Nims, pages 153, 154).
BURDEN OF PROOF:
The burden of proving the existence of secondary meaning is, of course, upon the party who asserts
it. Thus, in the instant action the respondent, in
seeking to enjoin the appellant in the use of the
word ''budget'', has the burden of proving that the
word "budget" has acquired a secondary meaning
with regar'd to the respondent's business. (See Nims,
Section '336, ·page 1057, 1058; 87 C.J.S. 552; 150
ALR, page 1078). With regard to this burden of
proof, it has been said:
The burden of proof is a substantial one
tha't is, 'one to be. emphaticall~ discharged;
and must ~e sustained by a fair preponderance of evidence or by substantial evidence
16
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sufficient to show that the use of the word by
the defendant would resu'lt in passing off the
later's goods as those of the plaintiff * * *.
The burden of proof is particularly difficult
to meet where the word in dispute is an ordinary 1oord in the English l~anguage, properly
~applic,able to the subject matter of the sale.
* * * (150 ALR, page 1078 and ca'ses there
cited. Emphasis added).
Mr. Nims has said:
In actions based on defendant's use of a
descriptive word or dress of goods which, in
a secondary sense, indicates plaintiff's business or product, the burden is on the plaintiff
to show such secondary meaning, also that
defen'dan't is using them in their secondary,
not their primary sense. ( N ims, Section 336,
page 1057, 1058).
FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT SECONDARY MEANING EXISTS:
In determining whe'ther a term or word has acquired a secondary meaning, several factors are
generally considered. As has been said:
But it seems to be the practice of the
courts in determining whether the p~aintiff's
mark has acquired a secondary meaning, to
consider ( 1 ) the length and manner of use of
the name or mark in question, ( 2) the nature
and extent of advertising and promotion of
the mark, and ( 3) the efforts toward promoting a conscious connection in the minds of
the public of that name or mark with a parti17
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cular product. (Time, Inc. vs. Life T.elevision
Corporation (USDC, Minn. 1954) 123 F.
Supp. 471 at page 474, citing 52 Am. Jur.,
Trade 1\Iarks, Trade Names and Trad~ Practices, Section 73, and cases collected In 150
ALR 1067, 1082-1094).
Accord: Oakford Co. vs. Kroger Comp.any (USDC, Ill., 1957) 157 F. Supp. 4'53.
Large expenditures for advertising tend to
establish the acquisition of the secondary meaning
while conversely 'the lack of expenditure for advertising 'tends to disprove the acquisitio11 of a secondary meaning. (150 ALR, page 1090, 1091). The
respondent spent only $300.00 for advertising for
a fiscal year July 1958- June 30, 1959 (R. 99),
whereas for example, National Finance, a competitor, spent $300.00 a month for each branch office.
However, the question of whether or not secondary meaning has been established is one of fact
and not of princip1e, and consequently, no previous
case can be a controlling authority on the question
since each case must depend upon the facts applicable to that case alone. (150 ALR, page 1082).
Although a trade name need not acquire a 'secondary meaning everywhere in order to be entitled
to protection, the plaintiff must establish the existence of secondary meaning in more than a mere
neighborhood. It has been held that although the
exact territorial extent of a trade name is a question
18
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of fact, the narrowest limit that could reasonably
be imposed today wou,ld be that of a state (Federal
Glass Company vs. Loshin (CA 2nd 1H55) 224 F.
2d 100).
It should be noted that length of time of use
alone is not enough to establish secondary meaning.
Exclusiveness of use, extent of sales, and the extent
and manner of advertising are also very important.
(Nims, page 1039).
The followin·g quotations from lVIr. Nim's work
in the footnote a;t page 1040, 1041 give examples of
cases wherein the evidence was not sufficient to
prove secondary meaning.
In the following cases the evidence was
not sufficient to prove secondary meaning.
Quaker State Oil Refining Co. vs. Pennsylv,ani~a P.etrole~tm Products Co., 325 Pa 273,
189 Atl 473 (1937) 27 TM Rep 146.
"The only evidence from which it could
inferred that the name of complainant's product had acquired a secondary meaning, prior
to 1919, is 'that its product has been marketed
and had been nationally advertised for five
years under this name. There is no other evidence from which it could be inferred that
the public associated 'Quaker State' or 'Quaker' with the complainant's product at tha't
time. 'The mere adoption and use of words
in advertisemen'ts, circulars and price lists and
on signs and stationery give no exclusive right
to their use.' DeLong Hook & Eye Co. v. Hump
10
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Hairpin Mfg. Co., 297 Ill. 359, 364, 130 NE
765, 11 TM Rep 239."
Erwyn Products, Inc. v. Lander Co., Inc.,
39 F. Supp. 49 (SD NY 1941), 49 PQ 452.
Sales of about 2,000 pieces of the product
bearing the claimed mark in a year and four
rnonths, and that it had advertised in a magazine and had window displays in about ten
?rug stores did not establish secondary meanIng.
Sleight Metallic Ink Co., v. Marks, 52 F.
(2d) 664 (ED Pa 1930). Three witnesses
testified that the word "Metallic" v;as i'dentified in their minds with plaintiff's ink; but
during the time when this secondary meaning
was claimed to have been created plaintiff's
use was not exclusive, and this v1as one of
the reasons for holding tha't the word had not
acquired a secondary meaning.
Sun V~alley Manufacturing Co. v. Sun
Valley Togs, 39 F. Supp 502 (SD NY 1941),
49 PQ 559. The elemen'ts required for secondary meaning were listed as (a) "length of
use of such name". (b) "the nature and extent of popularizing and advertising such
name". (c) "the efforts in pro1no'ting consciousness of the public in connecting that
name with a particular product." The period
during which plaintiff had used the name
"Sun Valley" 'vas too short, the c1aimed extensive advertising was inadequately proved,
and there was insufficient evidence to establish confusion either of the trade or of the
public. A preliminary injunction against defendant's use of its corporate name was denied. See also Actien,gesellscha.ft V eJ~einigete
20
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Ultrama-rine F'abriken v. Amberg, 102 F. 551
(D NJ 1900); Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. North,
148 Md 609 (1925), 130 Atl57, 43 ALR 206;
Hiram Walker & Sons v. Penn-Maryland
Corp., 79 F. (2d) 836, 839 (CCA 2, 1935), 28
PQ 44; Steem-Electric Co. v. H erzfeld-Phillipson, 118 F. (2d) 122, 125 (CCA 7, 1940), 48
PQ 92.

SIMILARITY AND CONFUSION:
Words in common use are common property and
may be tlsed by others with other descriptive words,
provided that the combination does not render it
probab'le that persons possessing ordinary powers of
perception will be misled. An organization may be
denied the exclusive right in a name or word which
is a common or generic or descriptive term, and the
use of such word or name by another will not be
actionable unless the later user is attempting to
"palm off" his business as the former one. American
Gold Star Mothers, I1tc. v. N,atior~Jal Gold Star Mothers, Inc., 191 F. '2d 488, 27 ALR 2d 948; Beverly
Hills Hotel Corp. v. Hilton Hote~s Corp. (Calif. Dist.
Ct. of App. 1955) 285 P. 2d 1012. The test is whether
or not the names are so similar as to render it probable that persons possessing ordinary powers of
perception will be mislead.
In the instant case respondent contends that
appellant's name "Budget Loan and Finance Plan"
is so decep'tively 'similar to respondent's name "Budge't System" as to warrant injunctive relief.
21
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In the case of Feder~al Securities Company v.
Feder.al Securities Corporation (Oregon Sup. Ct.
1929) 129 Ore. 375, 276 Pac. 1100, 66 ALR 934,
plaintiff sued to enjoin defendant's use of its corporate name, con'tending that the similarity entitled
plaintiff to such relief. The court refused to enjoin,
saying that one corporation cannot restrain another
from using in its corporate title a name or word to
which all o'thers have a common right. The court
further stated that a greater degree of similarity in
names of corporations will be tolerated where they
are geographical or descriptive than v1here the first
corporation's 11ame is fanciful and arbitrary. There
was evidence of misdirected mail and telephone cal1s.
In this regard the court said :
The evidence in'dicates that, after the
defendant opened its office in Portland, some
mail matter, 'telegrams, and packages intended
for the one were delivered to the other. Instances occurred where telephone calls were
misdirected, and upon two occasions the telegraph companies became confused in making
charges for their services. We are satisfied,
however, that much of this sort of confusion
will disappear as the postal department, telegraph companies, and deliverymen become acquainted with the two companies; such was
the experience in Umpqua Broccoli Exch. v.
Um-Qua Val:ley Broccoli G1·ozeers, 117 Or.
678, 245 Pac. 324. The evidence is clear that
'the d~f~nda:nt has never 'taken advantage of
the Similarity of names, and has instructed
its employees to make no misrepresentations
22
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concer11ing its identity; in fact, we seem to be
warranted in concluding tha't the defendant is
possessed of no desire to appear as the plaintiff. ( 66 ALR at page 938, 939).
The court further stated:

* * * p1,·imarily it is not the name which

is protected, btttt the business; the l,atter is
guarded ,ag~ainst injury through ,a fraudulent
traffic in its name by later comers. The business will be protected whether conducted in
the name of an individual or 'that of a corpora'tion; whether the name is fanciful or not.
But, to just-ify relief, the curc?J~mst,ances must
be such that it ~appBars tl'bat the business will
suffer from ,a ~deceptive use of its name, or
tlvat by re,ason of a similar ~act of unfair competition, the public will be impose~d upon. ( 66
ALR at page 945, emphasis added).

* * * When it has been found tha't there
is a similarity of names, a court does not cease
its inquiries and at once grant relief, bu't proceeds to ascertain whether the other facts are
such that deception and injury are likely. ( 66
ALR at page 94'7).
And Nims has said:
The courts allow for the fact that in the
ordinary course of buBiness a certain amount
of error and confusion will occur ·and no matter how great the difference in names, marks
and packages. ( Nims, page 104 7).
In the case of Beverly Hills Hotel Corp. v.
Hilton Hotels Corp. (Calif. Dist. Ct. of App. 1955)
285 P. 2d 1012, plaintiff sued to restrain the use of
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a name. In denying the injunction the court held
that the names "The Beverly Hrlls. Hotel" and "The
Beverly Hilton" were not so similar as to warrant
the relief sought. There was evidence that deliveries
w~re misdircted and that the newspapers had confused the nameso
In the case of FTas,er v. Singer, (Georgia 1954)
83 S.E. 2d 599, the court held 'that there was not
sufficient similar1ty between "Singer's Casual
Shop" and "C~asual Corner" and refused to enjoin;
in Applebaum v. Senior (Calif. f957) 316 P. 2d
410, the eourt denied re'lief where the names were
"Junior's Boot Shon"
and "Senior's Junior Boot
.a:
Shop"; and in V.ermont Motor Company, Inc. v.
Monk (Ver1nont 1950) 116 Vt. 309, 75 A 2d 671,
the court refused to protect "Vermont Motor Company" against "Vermont Motor Sales".

The rule is well stated in Middletowr;L Trust Co.
v. Middletown Natior~Jal Bank, (Conn.) 110 Conn.
13, 20; 14 7 A 22, 25, as follows:
No inflexible rule can be laid down as to
\vhat use of names will constitute unfair competi'tion; this is a question of fact. The question to be determined is whether or not, as a
matter of fact, the name is such as to cause
confusion in the public mind as between the
plaintiff's business and that of the defendant,
resulting in injury to the pl~aintiff. The test
. is whether the public is likely to be deceived.
* * * It is not sufficien't that son1e person
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may possibly be misled, but the similarity
must be such that any person, with reasonab'le care and observation as the public generally are capable of using and may be expected
to exercise, would be likely to mistake one for
the other.
The Vermont Motor Company case, supra, is
substantially similar to the instant case. There the
plaintiff was incorporated in 1932 and had engaged
in the business of selling and servicing motor vehicles and parts under the name Vermont Motor
Company. Although its activity had been limited
in later years it intended to continue in the business. It maintained a place of business, a telephone
listing and carried on a small amount of advertising. Defendants were partners and began business
in 1948 u~nder the name Vermont Mo'tor Sales in
the same city as <plaintiff. Defendants did a substantial business selling approximately 400 vehicles
per year, and had a Studebaker franchise. They advertised extensively. The plaintiff claimed a preferential right to the words "Vermont Motor". There
was some evidence of confusion and inconvenience
caused by misdirection of mail. In denying the requested injunctive relief the court stressed the fact
that plaintiff had failed to prove any financial
damage attributable to defendant's use of the name.
The court quoted witl1 approval the passage from
the Middletown Trust Case, set out supra, and also
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from the Federal s,ecurities case, supra. With regard
to the inconvenience of misdirected mail tl1e court
said:
The plaintiff relies on the finding that
it has been caused son1e inconvenience by the
misdelivery of mail in support of its claim
that the similarity of names causes confusion.
it cites three cases in support of this contention.. A reading of these cases discloses either
that trouble with mail delivery was only one of
several reasons for the finding of such confusion as would justify injunctive relief or
that the ca'ses were decided as tl1ey were on
other groundso We hav.e found no cas,e where
such relief was gr~anted for this reason alone.
For cases denying such relief for this reason
see Ann. 66 ALR at page 972.

* * * Moreover, i't does not seem that
mere inconvenience without consequent loss is
sufficient to warrant injunctive interference.
( 75 A 2d at page 673, emphasis added).
There are many examples of substantial similarity of names in the immediate Salt Lake metropolitan area in 'the finance business., as well as other
businesses, such as American Finance Company,
American Co-op Finance Company, American Savings and Loan Association, Continental Bank and
Trust Company, Continental Credit Corporation
(Exhibit 14), Continental Loans, Inc., General
Credit Company, General Finance Company, Utah
Credi't Company and Utah Finance Company.
26
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POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT HAS ACQUIRED TI-IE EXCLUSIVE
RIGHT TO USE OF THE WORD "BUDGET" IN CONDUCTING ITS CREDIT AND LOAN BUSINESS IN
TI-IE SALT LAKE CITY AREA.

Our argumen't under Point I and II also applies to Point III. However, in addition thereto we
would like to call the Court's attention to the fact
that 'the respondent did not acquire the exclusive
use of the word "Budg~t". In 19H5 the Barkers, the
predecessors in interest of this respondent, filed an
affidavit of doing business under an assumed name
of Budget Finance ( R. 34, 185). That they did
btlsiness under the name of Budget Finance until
1957 (R. 51, 52). In the fall of 1957 'they ceased
to do business under the name of Budg~t Finance
(R. 55).
It is the position of this appellant that the predecessor in interest of this respondent established
a distinct and separate property right in the name
"Budget Finance" and that he abandoned the same
in 1957. Upon abandon1nent the same was subject
to apropriation or use by 'this appellant. At the
time Mr. Barker reincorporated in 195'7, he and
his wife transferred only their small loans to a corporation incorporated as Budget System, Inc., which
is the respondent herein (R. 34). He discontinued
doing business as Budget Finance, selling all of his
27
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stock to Barker & Company (R. 55). There is no
question but what the n'ame "Budget Finance" was
abandoned.
We pose the question, suppose that Mr. Barker
had eontinued to use the name "Budget Finance"
after 'the reincorporation. Cou'ld the respondent corp-oration enjoin the use by Mr. Barker of the name
"Budget Finance"? Without any question, of course,
he could not.
So we pose the ques1tion, if they cou1d not enjoin
Mr. Barker from continuing the use of it, why
could not 'this appellant adopt this name after it
had been abandoned? It had never been acquired by
the respondent by use, conduct, or by purchase.
Trade name rights, like other rights based upon
user, may be lost by abandonment, non-user, laches,
or acquiescence. (See Nims, 4th Edition, Section
408). Where it plainly appears that the right to use
a trade name has been abandoned, the courts will
not restrain the use of such name by another person. See 48 ALR 1264 and cases. Rights and respect
of a 'trademark or trade name n1ay be terminated
by abandonment. See 52 Am. J ur. 524.
While the rule is to the effect that intention
governs abandonment, such intention need not be
directly shown. It is not necessary to produce declara'tions of an intent to abandon; such intent may
be inferred from the circu1nstances. (Nims, Section
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408). Where a business has been discontinued the
trademarks used in connection with it are abandoned since they cannot exist apart from the business. (Nims, Section 408, Page 1278, citin'g cases).
There can be no question that the name "Budget
Finance" was a clearly established business enterprise, separate and distinct from that of "Budget
System". That under the law this defendant, or any
other corporation or individual, had the right to
adopt such name. There is no question that Barker
could have continued to use it, and certainly this
appellant, in view of the absolute abandonment,
could adopt the same.
P'OTNT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS D'ECREE
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT HEREIN, BUDGET
SYSTEM, INC., AND AS AGAINST THIS APPELLANT,
BUDGET LOAN AND FINANCE PLAN.

Our arguments in Point I, Point II, and Point
III are also material and pertinent to Point IV.
It is the position of this appellant 'that a corporate name which includes words of generic or
common use will not receive protection unless the
name has acquired a secondary meaning. All of the
cases support tl1is rule. The respondent h'as failed
in his proof, of whicl1 he has the burden, to establish this fact.
29
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The law is clear, in our opinion, that to enjoin
unfair competition it is necessary to show fraud
and deceit CNims Unfair Competition and Trade
Marks, Fourth Edition, Section 6, Pages 40 and
41, citing R.eynolds & R.eynolds vs. Norick (CA lOth
1940) 114 F. 2d 278). This it has not done.
The only confusion tha't existed is that referred
to in the other Points as to misdirected telephone
calls and mail, which actually and in fact only
amounted to inconvenience to the respondent. Such
inconvenience canno't and does not amount to fraud
or deceit, nor does it amount to deception to respondent's customers, potential or present. It is very
significant that the misdirected telephone cal1s and
mail consisted entirely of appellant's customers. No
evidence was introduced that respondent's customers
were misled into thinking that appellant was in fact
respondent. In other words, there was no evidence
to the effect that any customer of respondent was
deceived or confused by virtue of appella11t's operation in the Salt Lake Area.
We think it is very important and a major
factor which should be considered by this Honorable Court; that is, the issuance of a license by the
Bank Commissioner of the State of Utah to this
appellant to operate a smal1 loan corporation under
the laws of the State of Utah under the name of
"Budget Loan and Finance Plan". As this Honorso
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able Court well knows, one cannot operate a savings
and loan company, a bank, a small loan company,
or an industrial loan company except by the issuance of a charter or license therefore by the Bank
Commissioner of the Sta'te of Utah. It is well l{nown
that before issuing such a license or charter, a Bank
Commissioner either holds a hearing or makes an
extensive investigation as to location, name, character, financial responsibility, and other factors before he will issue a license or charter. In this case
we must presume tha;t the Bank Commissioner made
such an investigation before issuing a license to do
business under the name of Budget Loan and Finance Plan. The Bank Commissioner, of course, was
aware of the small loan license issued to Budget
System, Inc.
It is fundamental that courts are reluctant to
substitute their judgment for that of an administrative body where there is no evidence to show that
there has been an abuse of discretion by that administrative agency.
Certainly there has been no such showing here
and we must conclude that the Bank Commissioner,
after an investigation, deemed it in his opinion 'to
be proper.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion we respectfurly submit:
1. That the word 'budget" in respondent's
name is generic and respondent cannot claim the
exclusive use or possession of that word without
showing that it has acquired a secondary meaning.
This it has no't done.

2. That the name of the appellant is not so
similar to respondent's name as to constitute an
unlawful and unfair use; and indeed that the degree
of similarity between respondent's and appellant's
names is no greater than the similarity between the
names of respondent's parent corporation and its
competitors in the area.
3. Thal the only confusion shown in the record
is that of appellant's customers going to respondent,
largely during the time prior to the listing of appellant's name in the telephone book.
4. That the evidence is conclusive that there
has been an absolute abandonment; that the name
"Budget Finance" was a name which had been used
and had been treated as a distinct property right by
Barkers. There is no doubt that because of its abandonment and the fact that it was a separate property right, that other people had the right to adopt
it. Barker himself conclusively proved by his testimony that he considered that there was a distinctive
32
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difference, by filing the affidavit referred to and
using the n'ame "Budget Finance".
5. We feel that the action of the Bank Commissioner in permitting the use of 'the name "Budget
Loan and Finance P1an" is significant and should
be given great weigh't.
Respectfully submitted,
LOUIS H. CALLISTER and
NATHAN J. FULLMER

Couns.el jor App.ellant

619 Continental ·Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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